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Abstract 
 
There is a literature on the causes of wage rigidity and there is a literature on within-
firm wage structures. We use a survey of CEOs to show that the two are interlinked in 
that the proposed explanations for the compression of wages within firms also provide 
an explanation for wage rigidity.  
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1. Introduction 
Explaining wage rigidity is central to our understanding of persistent unemployment 
as well as the business cycle. Another field of study in labor economics focuses on 
wage structures within firms. We follow Romer (1992) in taking seriously the 
contention that these two are linked in that the literature on wage dispersion goes a 
long way towards explaining the causes of wage rigidity. Put simply, managers do not 
want to lower wages because this may cost them their better workers and they do not 
want to lower the wages of the less productive workers only because this would skew 
the internal wage structure.1 A recession makes firms lay off the workers who 
contribute least to profits while the more valuable workers are spared. We test this 
hypothesis by surveying the managers of 401 companies in Iceland. 
 
2. Wage Compression 
Wages are compressed when the difference between the productivity of two 
individuals working in the same firm exceeds the difference in wages.2 Multiple 
reasons for wage compression can be found in the literature. Lazear (1989) explains 
why managers may decide to compress intra- firm wages in order to create harmony 
among workers.3,4 Bewley (1999) interviewed 300 managers and found strong support 
for the impact of wage cuts on morale. Efficiency-wage models – such as Akerlof and 
Yellen (1990) – show how workers’ effort depends on a comparison of actual wages 
and perceived fair wages. Teulings and Hartog (1998) describe the role of norms and 
contracts in affecting the distribution of the surplus generated in employment 
contracts within the corporatist setting. Romer (1992) shows how the compression of 
wages relative to marginal productivity can raise productivity when workers’ 
perceptions of fairness – and hence their effort – depend on an inter- firm comparison 
                                                 
1 This explanation contrasts with the idea of adverse selection because in our story managers observe 
the productivity of workers – and can choose whom to hire and fire – value the more productive more 
than the less productive ones, and try to retain their stock of productive individuals through selective 
layoffs in recessions instead of wage reductions. 
2 See Booth and Zoega (2004) on different definitions of wage compression and the relationship 
between wage compression and firms’ training decision.  
3 In contrast, tournament theory demonstrates how the intra-firm wage distribution can be used to 
motivate workers (see Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Another model explaining the dispersion of wages is 
that of Calvo and Wellisz (1979) who argue that if shirking at the top is more expensive than at the 
bottom – because when a manager shirks his duties all his subordinates may follow his example – the 
manager needs to be paid more. 
4 A similar argument is found in Milgrom and Roberts (1990). They argue that wage inequalities may 
give rise to rent-seeking behaviour within firms when workers change their behaviour with the aim of 
ensuring wage increases. 
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of wages. In Frank (1984) wage compression within firms can be an equilibrium 
phenomenon if workers differ in their preferences for relative standing or prestige.5 In 
a recent paper, Booth and Zoega (2005) demonstrate how wage compression arises if 
the more productive workers face fewer employers due to the sophistication of the 
tasks they perform.  
 
3. Wage Rigidity  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to survey the vast literature on nominal and real- 
wage rigidity. What is important from our perspective is to note that a great majority 
of these models is based on the representative-agent framework. Union models and 
models in the insider-outsider tradition (such as Lindbeck and Snower, 1989) do 
distinguish between employment states; employed workers and the unemployment 
ones; entrenched employed workers and new entrants, but they do not distinguish 
between workers of different attributes. The same applies to efficiency-wage models.6
 In this paper we want to explore the hypothesis that the causes of wage rigidity are 
to be found in models of heterogeneous agents, in particular the models of wage 
compression surveyed above. If some workers are observationally better than others 
and if – due to wage compression – these are worth more to firms than the less able 
ones, it follows that firms would want to respond to a recession by selectively laying 
off the least able workers instead of cutting all wages. Lowering wages risks losing 
the better workers making the firing of the least able ones desirable. This explanation 
provides an alternative to the ones based on the representative-agent model. 
 
4. The Survey 
Our empirical analysis has three objectives. First, we are interested in using survey 
data to establish managers’ perception of the degree of wage rigidity. Secondly, and 
most importantly, we would like to test whether our proposed explanation for wage 
rigidity has any support, i.e. whether wage rigidity is due to the compression of 
wages. Finally, we will attempt to establish some of the reasons for wage 
                                                 
5 He finds support for his theory in the case of salespeople and university professors (high-wage 
individuals are paid less than their marginal product and vice versa for the low-wage individuals). 
6 An important exception is the work in the adverse-selection tradition (see Weiss, 1990), where 
workers differ in abilities but employers do not observe these innate differences between workers. 
Employers then resort to paying wages likely to attract and retain qualified workers. In this scenario, 
employers are less prone to cutting wages in recessions and more likely to fire workers because they 
assume that the better workers have better opportunities elsewhere and will quit, leaving the inferior 
ones to stay on. 
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compression, hence testing some of the multiple explanations for wage compression 
surveyed in Section 1 above.  
Our survey is comparable to that of Agell and Lundborg (1995) who surveyed a 
sample of large Swedish, manufacturing firms. They found that workers’ concerns 
about relative wages and fairness were important in explaining why firms do not cut 
wages in downturns. This contrasts with some of the Anglo-Saxon studies; Blinder 
and Choi (1990) found that – in addition to considerations of fairness – concerns 
about higher turnover prevent firms from cutting wages and Campbell and Kamlani 
(1997) attribute wage rigidity to managers’ fear of losing the better workers through 
wage cuts, which they explain as adverse selection. A study of British firms by 
Kaufman (1984) found that managers feared the effect of wage cuts on worker’s 
effort. It seems that while the Anglo-Saxon studies provided some support for 
efficiency wage theories of the adverse selection and moral hazard type, the Swedish 
study provided support for a model where effort depends on workers’ subjective 
notion of what constitutes a fair wage. Finally, Franz and Pfeiffer (2003) surveyed 
German firms and found strong support for explanations based on labor union 
contracts and implicit contracts, in particular for the less skilled. 
Our survey will enable us to compare survey results in Iceland to those in the 
countries listed above. Iceland has a population of 293,000 people, the vast majority 
of the working-age population belonging to the service sector. Its labor market is well 
integrated geographically and the population mass is urban and concentrated in the 
capital city Reykjavik and vicinity. Union density is around 84% (in 1998) and 
coverage almost complete. Union contracts in many cases serve as de facto minimum 
wages, actual wages being negotiated between employer and employee. However, in 
some cases – especially in the lower segments of the labor market – negotiated wages 
are also paid wages. There is significant coordination between unions and between 
employers. Unemployment benefits are not generous – not dependent on past income 
– and their duration is limited. Finally, firms have flexibility in the hiring and firing of 
workers, legalized firing restrictions being minimal (1-3 months of notice depending 
on tenure and not severance pay). Perhaps partly due to the flexibility of labor market, 
the country ranked ninth in the world in terms of (PPP-adjusted) GDP per capita in 
2002 and second in terms of a quality-of- life index (The Economist, World in 
Figures). 
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4.1 Method 
Our sample consisted of 718 firms in Iceland with more than 3 employees each7. It is 
randomly selected from the National register of firms. These are all independent 
firms, not branches of larger companies. They are located in all parts of the country 
and include firms in manufacturing, services and retail/whole-sales. In each firm, 
either the CEO or the CFO answered the survey questions. Of the 718 firms 
contacted, 236 managers refused to answer and 81 could not be reached. Therefore, 
401 completed the questionnaire, which amounts to a 56% response rate.  
 The survey was done via telephone between March 9 and April 11 2005.8 Calls 
were made during weekdays by trained interviewers and they always asked for the 
CEO. If he or she was not in, the interviewer asked for the CFO. If neither was in, a 
call was made later same day or the following day. 9  
 The questionnaire had 12 questions in addition to some background questions. It 
started with a question addressing the issue whether more productive workers obtain 
relatively lower pay than those who are less productive and why that would be the 
case. The question that follows concerns the reasons why managers valued the more 
productive workers so highly – assuming they answered the first question in the 
affirmative – giving three possible reasons based on our discussion in Section 1 
above. A random half of the respondents obtained these last two questions and the 
other half was not asked. This was done in order to be able to evaluate whether the 
mention of the importance of more productive workers would affect answers to the 
questions that followed. As it turned out, no difference was found between the two 
groups when it came to the following five questions that followed.  
 All respondents were then asked whether they would cut wages in a recession. 
Those who answered that they would not cut wages were then asked about the 
importance five specific reasons played as to why it would be difficult to cut wages on 
the scale of 1-4 (1 = not important, 2 = of minor importance, 3 = moderately 
important, 4 = very important). These are the five most important reasons out of eight 
                                                 
7 The survey was a part of an omnibus Gallup Iceland conducts a few times a year with Icelandic 
businesses constituting the sample. Gallup Iceland has acquired an ISO-9001:2000 quality certification 
for all its operation. 
8 The survey was conducted by Gallup in Iceland. 
9 Questions were programmed in CATI (computer assisted telephone interview) software called NIPO. 
When a call was made and a respondent accepted the interview, each question appeared on a computer 
screen in front of the interviewer and answers were immediately punched in at the keyboard. All 
answers were saved in a database and after the last interview transformed to SPSS, which was 
subsequently used to analyse the results. 
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asked by Campbell and Kamlani (1997) using the same response scale. The questions 
were asked in a random order between interviews. Finally, the respondents were 
asked to name the reasons as the most important and the second most important in 
order to obtain an additional measure of their importance.  
We first show descriptive results that address the issue of wage compression 
directly. We then look at its role in causing wage rigidity.  
 
4.2 Wage compression 
The first question addressed the issue of whether the more able workers contributed 
more, less than or the same to profits. This is a direct test of the hypotheses put forth 
in Section 1 above. Responses – shown in the first line of the table below – reveal that 
55.5% of respondents agreed that the more able workers contribute more to profits 
while 40.9% said they contribute as much as others. Only 3.6% said that they 
contribute less.10. Those who said that the more able workers contributed more to 
profits were then asked about the likely reason why the more able or productive 
workers were paid less in comparison to their productivity. The responses are shown 
in the second line of Table 1. By far the most important reason had to do with the 
effect on the morale of other workers, 39.6% stated this as the main reason. About 
16% claimed that they are paid less because outside job opportunities are more limited 
for these workers; there are relatively fewer workplaces where they can get desirable 
jobs. The asymmetric information explanation – that other employers don’t know 
about the abilities of able workers – received less support, or 10.1%. Over 34% 
mentioned other reasons.11 
 
4.3 Wage rigidity and its causes 
We have set forth the hypothesis that the greater value attached to the more able 
workers may be the real reason behind the observed rigidity of wages. In the third line 
of the table below we ask directly about wage rigidity. An overwhelming majority of 
90.6% claim that they would not lower wages during recession and the rest (9.4%), on 
the other hand, said they would lower the wages. No significant difference was 
                                                 
10 Background variables included: urban versus rural location; annual turnover; number of employees; 
number of office workers; consumer versus business-to-business markets; industry. Cross tabulation of 
these responses with the background variables revealed no significant differences. 
11 Almost 50% of managers of manufacturing companies said the reason for not paying more able 
workers more was morale reasons, as did about 30% the managers of firms in services and retail or 
whole sales. On the other hand, about 60% of managers of companies in retail or whole sales 
mentioned other reasons than those three listed, compared to less than 35% in the sample in general. 
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observed with respect to the background questions. Those who said they would not 
lower wages during a recession were then asked why not in an open-ended question. 
The four main reasons are presented in the fourth line of the table. Over 20% of 
respondents claimed that wages are not reduced because of union contracts. The 
second largest group, or 16.1%, stated that it was very difficult or impossible, 11.7% 
said that they would prefer selective layoffs instead and 10.0% fear the impact of 
wage reductions on voluntary quits while 40% gave miscellaneous othe r reasons.12  
Given the large proportion of respondents giving miscellaneous and unclear 
reasons in response to the previous question, we attempted to come close to 
managers’ intuition by proposing a set of five explanations of the eight put forth in 
Campbell and Kamlani's research (1997). The first column of the lower half of Table 
1 gives the proposed reasons for wage rigidity. The managers were asked to say 
whether each reason was very important, moderately important, of minor importance 
or not important at all. After rating the reasons, each manager then ranked them as the 
most important and the second most important one. The average score is shown in the 
second column; the proportion of those who rated the reason as very important is in 
the third column. The number in the last column is the percentage of those who put  
the relevant reason as the most important multiplied by two plus the percentage of 
those who put the reason as the second most important, divided by three.  
Over 60% of the managers responded that the reason for not lowering wages is the 
fear of losing the most experienced workers is very important. The fear of increasing 
quits and turnover and the risk of losing the most productive workers received similar 
average scores. Of the two, the fear of losing the most productive workers is ranked as 
more important than reducing quits and turnover. Hence, two of the most important 
reasons stated for not cutting wages were based on the idea of heterogeneous workers. 
Efficiency-wage theory in the form of lower wages reducing effort obtained 
somewhat less support and implicit-contract theory did not have many adherents 
among the respondents.13 
                                                 
12 Over 30% of managers of larger companies mentioned union contracts as the main reason for not 
being able to reduce wages during recessions. About 22% of managers of companies in consumer 
markets said that it would be impossible or very difficult to lower wages while 13% of managers of 
companies in business-to-business stated this reason. 
13 However, the implicit-contracts explanation was given greater importance by managers of smaller 
companies, both measured by the number of employees and yearly turnover. 
Table 1. Summary of important results 
More As much Less   
(1) 
Able workers’ contribution to profits in comparison 
to that of the less able ones 55.5 40.9 3.6   
Morale would suffer 
among other workers 
Limited job 
opportunities 
Other potential employers 
are imperfectly informed Other reasons  (2) 
Able workers get paid less relative to their 
productivity because... 39.6 16.1 10.1 34.2  
Yes No    (3) Would your company lower wages in a downturn? 9.4 90.6    
Union contracts Very difficult Prefer to lay off workers Raise quits Other  
(4) Why would your company NOT lower wages? 22.2 16.1 11.7 10.0 40.0 
  Average score (1-4) 
Very important 
(%) 
Most (2) and second most 
(1) important (weighted 
%) 
  
Wage reduction may cost the firm its most 
experienced workers who embody the most firm-
specific human capital. 
3.48 61.4 37.9 
  
Wage reduction risks losing the most productive 
workers while layoffs can target the least productive 
ones. 
3.08 38.4 25.1 
  
Wage reduction would increase quits and turnover 
and hence raise the cost of hiring and training. 3.12 40.8 15.6 
  
Wage reduction would reduce effort and 
productivity and lead to less customer satisfaction. 2.91 35.6  12.1 
  
(5) 
Workers dislike unanticipated wage changes, hence 
the implicit contract that wages not be reduced in a 
downturn or raised in an upturn. 
2.60 20.9 9.4 
  
 5. Conclusions 
In sum, we have found that managers avoid wage reductions in slumps because of the 
effect of a general reduction in wages on the likelihood that desirable workers – either 
because of experience of inherent ability – leave the firm and – to a lesser extent – 
concerns about the overall level of quitting. While the latter support models in the 
quitting variant of efficiency wage models (such as Salop, 1979), the former provides 
direct support for models of a compressed internal wage structure, in contrast to 
macroeconomic models based on the representative-agent model. Finally, implicit 
contract theory receives scant support and the effort variant of efficiency wage theory 
some but not great support.  
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